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Abstract 
 
This paper examines the effect of conflict on agricultural production of 
small-farmers. We use a unique household survey applied to 4.800 
households in four micro-regions of Colombia. The survey collects 
detailed information on households’ economic conditions, incidence of 
violent shocks, and presence of non-state armed actors. We separate the 
effects of conflict on direct impacts, measured through conflict-induced 
shocks, and indirect impacts, measured through years of presence of non-
state armed actors. The results show the association between lower 
agricultural production and conflict transmits through different channels. 
In regions with an intense conflict, yearly agricultural revenues per 
hectare and investments are lower, and households concentrate production 
on seasonal crops and pasture. Presence of non-state armed actors is 
associated with an immediate increase in production costs, lower access 
to formal financial institutions, and lower investments. The results 
suggest that households are affected by indirect and direct impacts that 
may induce sub-optimal agricultural decisions. Although traditional 
reconstruction efforts are crucial, post-conflict policies should also aim to 
reduce uncertainty and improve the rule of law to foster increases in 
production.   
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1. Introduction 
Conflicts impose costs on economic production through two broad channels. First, conflict-
induced shocks cause devastation and limit market transactions. Armed combats, terrorist 
attacks, looting or overall devastation generate the destruction of public and private capital, 
and assets; thereby decreasing the productive capacity of firms and households (Blattman 
and Miguel 2010; Ibáñez and Moya 2010; Justino 2011). Aggressions against the civil 
population destroy or deteriorate human capital through abductions, killings and maiming 
(De Walque 2006; Camacho 2008; Walque and Verwimp 2009; Verwimp, Bundervoet et 
al. 2010). Direct impacts of conflict also reduce market efficiency. Contraction in the 
supply of goods, and higher transactions costs cause prices increases, and reductions in the 
size of networks (Deininger 2003; Justino 2011). All these effects produce a drop in 
households’ in income and consumption, and countries experience a fall in the aggregate 
production (Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Brück 2004; Justino and Verwimp 2006).  
Second, presence of non-state actors pushes households to modify behavior in spite of not 
facing violent shocks. When non-state actors control a region and are hegemonic, attacks 
against the civil population and armed confrontations are infrequent (Kalyvas 2006). In 
addition, non-state actors assume many times the role of the state and impose their own 
rules of governance. Households adapt their behavior to prevent being the victim of attacks, 
or to respond to the new governance structures imposed by armed groups. Adaptation 
strategies amidst conflict may induce inefficiencies in production and increments in costs 
(Justino 2011; Rockmore 2011).  
Studies on the economic literature concentrate mostly on the direct impact of conflict 
shocks. However, identifying the strategies households adopt to confront conflict, despite 
not facing direct violent shocks, is important for three reasons. First, the bulk of the 
population is not directly affected by violent shocks, but a large proportion modifies their 
behavior in response to the violent context in which they live. This is particularly relevant 
for countries facing conflict of low or medium intensity that has lasted for many years. 
Second, households learn to live amidst conflict and change their behavior in subtle ways. 
These costs are largely unaccounted for in current studies and might be large. Third, once 
the conflict ends, households may remain entrenched in the low risk strategies adopted 
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during the conflict, preventing them from reaping the benefits of peace. Thus, income may 
not necessarily rebound in a post-conflict period for many households.  
Understanding these adjustments in behavior is important. Current studies underestimate 
the economic consequences of conflict. Furthermore, policies in post-conflict periods 
concentrate on reconstruction efforts, and largely ignore other negative consequences. In 
order to ensure a long-term recovery and sustainable post-conflict, policies should incentive 
households to separate from sub-optimal decisions adopted during conflict. 
The purpose of this paper is to identify how conflict affects household behavior through 
these two channels: direct and indirect impacts. We measure direct impacts through 
conflict-induced shocks and indirect impacts through years of presence of non-state armed 
actors. Our paper intends to understand whether conflict has an effect on household 
behavior beyond the impact of conflict-induced shocks. We concentrate the analysis on 
households’ decisions related to agricultural production such as yearly agricultural 
revenues, land use, investments, and access to financial markets.  
Our analysis uses a unique data set for Colombia, a country that has experienced a long-
standing conflict for fifty years. We designed a household survey to identify the impact of 
conflict-induced shocks and presence of non-state armed actors on household behavior. The 
survey collects detailed information on agricultural production, the occurrence of violent 
shocks, historic presence of armed groups, and the governance structure they impose upon 
the population. This unique data set allows us to examine to separate the impact of conflict 
t through shocks and presence of non-state actors.  
Estimating a causal relation between violent shocks and armed group presence, on the one 
hand, and agricultural decisions, on the other, is difficult. Presence of armed groups is not 
randomly allocated across the territory. Non-state actors establish presence on regions with 
particular geographical and institutional characteristics that favor their war objectives. 
Incidence of covariate shocks is not random either. Non-state actors attack certain groups of 
the population to illegally seize assets, strengthen territorial control, or prevent future civil 
resistance (Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Engel and Ibáñez 2007). An instrumental variable that 
correlates with presence of non-state armed actors and covariate shocks, but does not affect 
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agricultural production is difficult to find.  Our empirical strategy compares communities 
within states with a large variation in the extent of presence of non-state actors and 
incidence of violent shocks. We control for past history of violence in the community, and 
a rich set of household, community and geographical controls. In spite of not establishing 
causality, we are able to minimize the bias arising from omitted variables. Our results 
provide associations between conflict-induced shocks or presence of non-state actors, and 
agricultural production of households. We are also able to identify some of the channels 
through which this association occurs.  
Results of this paper show that conflict leads to contractions in agricultural production 
through different channels. In regions with intense conflict, yearly agricultural revenues per 
hectare are lower. Changes in land use from perennial to seasonal crops, and reductions in 
agricultural investments seem to be driving this association. Costs of conflict are present 
beyond those imposed by violent shocks. After controlling for violent shocks, households 
in regions with presence of non-state armed actors face higher costs per hectare, have a 
lower access to formal financial institutions, and invest less. However, households appear 
to habituate somehow to presence of non-state armed actors. Households adjust decisions 
such to re-optimize costs and investment decisions. Besides reconstruction efforts, post-
conflict policies should aim to restitute assets, foster credits, and create favorable 
conditions to reduce uncertainty.  
The structure of the paper is as follows. Next section briefly discusses the impact of conflict 
on households’ welfare and production. Section three provides a brief summary of the 
Colombian conflict. In section four, we describe the data and the empirical strategy, and 
discuss the results. Section five concludes.  
2. Conflict and Violent Shocks: Economic Consequences 
The economic costs of conflicts emerge due to direct impacts, such as destruction of factors 
of production and market impacts, or indirect impacts caused mainly by changes in 
behavior of economic agents. Most of the economic literature concentrates on measuring 
the direct impacts of conflict-induced shocks on factors of production (Blattman and 
Miguel 2010).  These studies associate measures of economic activities with incidence of 
violent events at the aggregate or individual level. Findings show that conflict negatively 
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affects economic performance, but countries and households may quickly recover from 
devastation if a threshold of destruction is not surpassed (Murdoch and Sandler 2002; 
Abadie and Gardeazabal 2003; Justino and Verwimp 2006; Nillesen and Verwimp 2010; 
Akresh, Verwimp et al. 2011).  
However, conflict imposes costs beyond destruction. Violence increases uncertainty and 
risks (Rockmore 2011). In addition, non-state actors may impose governance structures in 
the regions they control by enforcing rules of conduct, taxing households and production, 
obliging households to grow certain crops (i.e. illegal crops), and favoring some groups 
over others (Kalyvas 2006; Justino 2011). In spite of not facing violent shocks, households 
adjust their behavior in anticipation of a conflict induced-shock, to avoid being targeted, or 
to minimize potential losses after an attack or to abide rules imposed by non-state armed 
actors. These adjustments seek to minimize conflict risks, and not to maximize profits 
(Verpoorten 2009).  
Recent research provides examples on how households modify productive decisions to 
reduce conflict risks. First, small agricultural producers change their cattle portfolio 
(Verpoorten 2009). Cattle are difficult to conceal, and signal household wealth to non-state 
actors, which increases the likelihood of being targeted. Conversely, cattle can be easily 
sold, providing financial resources to households in times of need. Verpoorten (2009) finds 
the second effect dominates in Rwanda: cattle sales increase in war time to smooth 
household consumption. Sales are particularly responsive to covariate violent shocks vis-à-
vis idiosyncratic ones.  
Second, households shift income sources to protect consumption. In Mozambique, farmers 
relied more on subsistence activities, and reduced participation in markets activities. By 
shunning out of markets, households protected food consumption and their income. Weak 
labor markets intensified these effects because opportunities on off-farm work were scarce 
(Bozzoli and Brück 2009). Households also recur to income activities that are less sensible 
to conflict. Deininger (2003) finds that war increased start-ups in non-agricultural activities 
in Uganda.  
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Third, conflict induce adjustments in investment decisions though several channels. 
Households may save more as future income becomes increasingly uncertain (Verpoorten 
2009). Expected returns on assets change. Risk of attacks, and subsequent forced migration, 
imply that mobile assets are more valuable in conflict regions (Grun 2008). Because assets 
signal household wealth and some are difficult to conceal, assets may become liabilities 
(Engel and Ibáñez 2007; Rockmore 2011). Empirical findings show that conflict induces 
households to reduce the share of fixed assets and to increase the share of mobile assets, 
and reduces investment overall (Deininger 2003; Grun 2008).  
Since these adjustments in behavior seek to minimize conflict risk, households adopt sub-
optimal production decisions. Households living in conflict regions may produce less, earn 
lower profits, and face higher costs, despite not being direct victims of conflict induced-
shocks. In addition, sub-optimal strategies may persist after the conflict ends. In 
Mozambique, three years after the cease fire, households were still practicing many of the 
their war time coping strategies (Bozzoli and Brück 2009).  
The lack of detailed data on conflict dynamics limits the contributions of the papers 
discussed above. These papers explore potential adjustments in behavior in response to 
conflict, yet conflict is measured as incidence of violent shocks. These papers assume the 
coefficient for incidence of idiosyncratic or covariate shocks would capture losses from 
direct and indirect impacts, if these are correlated. However, conflict dynamics are 
complex. Kalyvas (2006) shows that, in regions in which non-state armed actors exercise a 
strong regional control, violence against civilians is lower or practically non-existent. Thus, 
the coefficient for conflict-induced shocks only captures a fraction of the economic losses 
from conflict. These costs, such as destruction and devastation of private assets and public 
infrastructure, are more easily recovered once conflict ends (Blattman and Miguel 2010).  
A noteworthy exception is Rockmore (2011) who separates the impact of subjective and 
objective risk. His estimates show subjective risk has a higher impact than objective risk on 
household consumption. In fact, half of welfare losses caused by conflict are related to risk 
and not to direct exposure to violence. Given data constraints, the paper separates risk into 
objective and subjective, and assumes the latter is influenced by household characteristics 
and not the dynamics of the conflict. Yet conflict dynamics play a large role on responses 
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of households. For example, the effect of the presence of non-state actors might be highly 
non-linear. At initial periods, households may react abruptly to presence of non-state actors, 
and incidence of shocks. Once non-state actors stay for a long period, households may 
habituate to their presence, and reactions are less abrupt or may converge to a low-income 
equilibrium, but with low risk of being victimized. In addition, Rockmore (2011) measures 
the effect on consumption, and not the impact on production decisions. This coefficient 
captures not only adjustments in productive behavior, but also the ability of household to 
rely on formal and informal insurance mechanisms.  
Our paper contributes to understand the association between conflict dynamics and 
households productive decisions. First, we have detailed information on incidence of 
shocks, and conflict dynamics. These allow us to separate tangible and intangible impacts 
of conflict. Second, we can capture the non-linear effects of conflict on households’ 
decisions. Lastly, we estimate the effect of conflict dynamics and conflict-induced shocks 
on agricultural production, and explore the potential channels through which this occurs.  
3. Conflict in Colombia 
During the twentieth century, Colombia faced two conflicts. The first conflict started in 
1948 after the assassination of Jorge Eliécer Gaitán, the presidential candidate from the 
Liberal party. During this period, named La Violencia, violent disputes between the two 
traditional political parties (Liberal and Conservador) originated the conflict. Near 200,000 
people died in the period ranging from 1948 and 1953 (Guzmán, Fals-Borda et al. 1963; 
Sánchez and Meertens 2001). In 1953, a military dictatorship, headed by General Rojas 
Pinilla, overthrew the democratic government and provided an amnesty to the liberal 
guerrillas. The dictatorship lasted five years. Democracy returned after the two traditional 
parties brokered a power sharing agreement that lasted from 1958 till 1974.  
Although the power sharing agreement eased violence, the underlying factors leading to 
conflict in the first place remained. Income inequality, weak institutions, lack of state 
presence and pervasive land disputes remained dormant in many regions of the country. In 
addition, this agreement excluded participation in the electoral arena for other political 
groups. Left-wing guerrilla groups, namely ELN and FARC, emerged during the 1960s 
aiming to overthrow the government. These guerrilla groups operated in isolated regions of 
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the country and launched sporadic attacks. By the end of the seventies, guerrilla groups 
intensified kidnappings, cattle theft and extortions against landowners and drug dealers in 
many regions of the country.  
Right-wing paramilitary groups were created during the 1980s. Several factors contributed 
to the emergence of these groups. First, the appearance of illegal drugs provided financial 
resources to strengthen left-wing guerrilla groups and to foster the creation of vigilante 
groups. Drug-dealers created vigilante groups as a response to kidnappings, cattle theft, and 
extortions (Verdad Abierta, 2011)
1
. Second, failed peace negotiations with guerrilla groups 
in 1982 and 1986 led to the appearance of these groups to protect the civil population 
against aggressions from guerrilla groups (Romero 2002). Third, land owners in several 
regions of the country created vigilante groups of less than 1.000 men to protect their 
properties and agricultural production (Duncan 2005; Duncan 2006). Initially, these groups 
were organized to defend land barons and drug dealers, yet in 1997 vigilante groups 
merged under the Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia (AUC) to contest the territories 
dominated by the guerrillas and to launch attacks in strategic regions to further their war 
objectives.  
The rise of paramilitary groups and the resources provided by coca cultivation fueled the 
conflict and contributed to its geographical expansion. Attacks against the civil population 
from guerrillas and paramilitaries heightened, leading to massacres, selective homicides, 
death threats and massive forced displacement. Today, 3.9 million people, equivalent to 8.4 
percent of the population have been forced to migrate
2
.  
Non-state armed actors consolidated significantly during this period. While in 1978, the 
FARC had seven fronts and 850 combatants, in 2000 these figures increased to 66 fronts 
and 16.000 combatants. The ELN increased to 4.500 combatants in 2000 from 350 in 1984 
(Sánchez, Díaz et al. 2003). In 1993, the AUC had 1.200 combatants, which increased to 
10.000 in 2002 (Echandía 2006). Graph 1 illustrates this sharp increase for the three groups, 
which reached its maximum number in 2002.  
[Graph 1 goes about here] 
                                                          
1
 www.verdadabierta.com retrieved on the 7th of July, 2012 
2
 www.accionsocial.gov.co retrieved on the 15
th
 of July, 2012.  
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From 2002 onwards, the conflict eased. Massive financial resources provided to the State 
Armed Forces, and a peace process with paramilitary groups contributed to reduce 
violence. The demobilization process with the AUC started in 2003 and ended in 2006. 
This lead to 38 collective demobilizations, equivalent 31.767 combatants (Valencia 2007). 
However, the demobilization was incomplete. Some groups did not demobilize and others 
preserved their warring structures. The groups mutated to drug-dealer bands, named 
BACRIM (Criminal Bands, for its Spanish Acronym), scattered around the country. In 
2009, 82 criminal groups with an estimated of 5.000 combatants were exercising presence 
in 273 municipalities (Fundación Nuevo Arco Iris, 2009
3
). On the other hand, guerrilla 
groups are still operating in several regions of the country. 
4. Empirical strategy 
 
The purpose of the empirical strategy is threefold. First, we estimate regressions to 
establish the association between yearly agricultural revenue per hectare, on the one hand, 
and covariate violent shocks and presence of non-state actors, on the other. By separating 
conflict-induced shocks and conflict dynamics, we provide evidence on how the 
complexities of conflict affect household behavior. Second, we explore the possible 
channels through which shocks and presence of non-state actors affect agricultural 
production: input prices, land use, investments and access to credits. We expect a 
heterogeneous response for the different outcomes. Third, we examine the non-linearity of 
the years of presence of non-state actors and the number of conflict induced shocks. This 
will provide evidence on how households learn to live amidst conflict.  
We assume households maximize consumption subject to a budget constraint. Sources of 
income are agricultural production in their own land plot, wage labor, and non-wage 
income. Households allocate time in on-farm work, off-farm work and leisure. Since access 
to financial markets is limited, production and consumption decisions are non-separable.   
Conflict affects households’ agricultural production through different channels. 
Agricultural production may decline due to direct attacks against the population such as 
                                                          
3
 http://www.verdadabierta.com/component/content/article/50-rearmados/1520-narcotrafico-extorsion-
sicariato-y-robo-de-tierras-tendrian-afectados-a-25-departamentos-el-tiempo retrieved on the 7
th
 of July, 2012. 
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destruction of yields, theft of productive assets, or land plundering, among others. Declines 
in agricultural production may also respond to mere presence of non-state actors.  In 
Colombia, non-state armed actors target certain groups of the community to instill fear, 
prevent civil resistance movements, or illegally seize assets (Engel and Ibáñez 2007). Thus, 
households may cut back agricultural production to reduce visibility in the community and 
prevent attacks. Reductions in production may increase prices of agricultural goods.  
Supply of inputs contracts in conflict regions. Destruction of infrastructure creates obstacles 
for transporting goods, reduces the supply of electricity and water, and forces financial 
institutions to close. Killings and maiming decreases labor supply. Risks of supplying 
inputs in conflict regions, and taxes imposed by non-state actors reduce profits for input 
producers; thereby supply contracts. As a result, prices of inputs and interest rates increase, 
causing higher short-run costs. 
Households adjust land use to protect consumption, reap the profits of agricultural 
production in the short-run, and to prevent investment losses. In order to protect household 
consumption, households retreat to subsistence farming. The fear of an extreme shortage of 
food, or the impossibility to smooth consumption due to the breakdown of informal risk-
sharing mechanisms prompts households to substitute from cash to food crops. This effect 
might be lower in countries in which markets still operate, such as Colombia (Rockmore 
2011). The risk of forced displacement or property loss may induce households to shift 
from perennial to seasonal crops, even if the former yield higher returns, because seasonal 
crops provide yields and returns in a shorter time period. However, if households expect to 
stay in their communities, they may prefer to cultivate perennial crops that can be left 
without close attention for longer periods of time, allowing households to be absent for 
long periods of time. Farmers may also expand cattle production, which can be easily sold 
if conflict intensifies. In extreme violence, farmers may increase the percentage of unused 
land  
Risk of abandoning or losing the land discourages investment in permanent structures or 
sunk costs that are difficult to recoup. In addition, visible assets signal wealth, increasing 
the risks of deliberate attacks from non-state armed actors. Both effects cause a reduction in 
productive assets and other investments directed to increase productivity.  A contraction on 
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the supply of financial credits, due to a lower presence of financial institutions, deepens the 
investment shortage. In countries with markets still operating, this contraction might be 
smaller. Because other households in the community are facing similar conditions, 
households may not be able to rely on informal credits from friends and family.  
4.1.The Data 
We use four different sources of data. The first source of data is the Colombian 
Longitudinal Survey of Universidad de los Andes (ELCA for its Spanish acronym). The 
Department of Economics designed ELCA to understand the impact of internal conflict on 
household welfare, labor markets, and agricultural production, among others. The first 
wave of the survey was administered during the first semester of 2010 to 10.800 
households, 6.000 households in urban areas and 4.800 in rural regions. The survey is 
representative of urban households from income stratum one to four, and four rural micro-
regions (Middle Atlantic, Central East, Cundi-Boyacense, and Coffee regions). We selected 
the micro-rural regions to maximize variation in conflict intensity. Two regions had a high 
intensity of conflict (Middle-Atlantic and Central East) and two a low intensity (Cundi-
Boyacense and Coffee region). Within each municipality, rural districts were chosen 
randomly. In this paper, we use the rural sample as conflict in Colombia occurs mainly in 
rural areas. In the sample, there are 17 municipalities and 222 rural districts in total. We 
only use households that report complete information on agricultural production, land use, 
and production costs, that are 1.801 households.  
The survey collects standard information about employment, income, consumption, 
education, health, family formation and social capital. For rural households, we collect 
detailed information on land tenure and property rights, agricultural production, and asset 
ownership. In addition, we designed a special module about shock incidence, which elicits 
information on conflict shocks. The questions were carefully designed to protect 
households, and reduce apprehension to answer accurately these questions. All households 
were geo-coded.  
We also designed a rural district questionnaire applied to leaders of the community. The 
purpose of this questionnaire is to gather information on social and public infrastructure, 
incidences of shocks, including conflict, and access to markets. The questionnaire elicits 
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detailed information on the history of conflict in the community during the last 10 years 
such as presence of non-state armed actors, imposition of rules and governance structures, 
and victimization of the civil population.  
Despite carefully designing the rural questionnaire to reduce underreporting of presence of 
non-state actors and conflict-induced shocks, some underreporting may persist and it might 
be systematic. Some rural districts have a strong presence of non-state armed actors and 
underreporting might be larger in these areas. Respondents may face fear or 
misapprehension to provide detailed information related to conflict. With the purpose of 
correcting this potential underreporting, we complemented the rural questionnaire with 
information for the National Government. In particular, we use information on presence of 
non-state armed actors at the rural district level during the last 10 years.  
In order to complement the household and the rural district questionnaire, we use 
geographical data, and a panel data of municipal characteristics. We matched geographical 
data from IDEAM and IGAC
4
 to each household, which allowed us to construct a rich set 
of geographical controls. Municipal characteristics are from the CEDE data panel which 
covers the period from 1990 till 2010.  
4.2. Estimation strategy 
In order to understand the effect of conflict on agricultural decisions, we estimate the 
correlation between conflict variables and yearly revenue per hectare. In order to calculate 
yearly revenue, we use the reported revenue per product per yield and multiply it by the 
number of yields obtained each year. We aggregate the yearly revenue per product and 
divide it by the land plot size. Then, we estimate regressions to explore which are the 
potential channels driving this association. We use the following reduced form for 
household i located in rural district j municipality k and state l 
                              ∑        
  
   
 ∑        
 
   
       
                                                          
4
 Government institutions responsible for collecting climatic information and geographic information, 
respectively.  
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where       are outcomes related to agricultural production such as yearly agricultural 
revenue per hectare, costs per hectare, percentage of land used on perennial crops, seasonal 
crops or pasture, whether the households invested in the land plot during the last three 
years, whether the household had a credit from a financial institution, and whether the 
household had a credit from family and friends.       is a vector of household controls,     
is a vector of rural district controls,     represents controls for municipality k from state l, 
   are fixed effects at the state level, and       is a random term. 
We capture conflict dynamics with the term ∑        
  
    ∑        
 
    .       is a 
dummy variable equal to one if non-state actors have been present in rural district jk for m 
years (m=1,2,…,10).  These set of dummies capture how household adjust decisions to 
presence of non-state armed actors, after controlling for conflict-induced shocks, and    
are the parameters of interest.       is a dummy variable equal to one if rural district jk face 
n types of conflict-induced shocks (n=1,2,…,5). Although the household questionnaire 
collects information on covariate and idiosyncratic violent shocks, we believe that 
underreporting is high and we prefer to use the information collected on the rural district 
questionnaire for covariate shocks. Conflict-induced shocks reported in the rural district 
questionnaire are murder, cattle theft, land seizure, threats by non-state armed actors, and 
kidnappings. These set of dummies capture the direct impact of conflict through 
destruction, devastation, and market impacts.    are the parameters traditionally estimated 
in other studies. By using dummy variables for years of presence and type of shocks, we are 
capturing the non-linear effects of both variables. We expect that the effect of presence of 
non-state armed actors is higher during the first years of presence and declines once 
households learn to live amidst conflict. On the other hand, an increasing number of types 
of shocks signal an intensification of the conflict. Thus, we expect the effect to be larger as 
the number of type of shocks increases.  
Presence of non-state armed actors and conflict induced-shocks is not random. Non-state 
armed actors intend to control regions that serve their war objectives, such as extracting 
economic rents or illegally seizing valuable assets, or with lower costs to establish 
presence, such as difficult geographic conditions or alienation of the civil population 
against the state. In addition, aggressions against the civil population are deliberate and not 
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a by-product of conflict. Non-state actors attack households with better-economic 
conditions to seize assets, or leaders of the community to weaken support to the opponent 
(Azam and Hoeffler 2002; Engel and Ibáñez 2007). We include a rich set of geographic, 
household, land plot, rural district and municipality controls to reduce potential bias due to 
omitted variables.  
We include household controls to account for preferences, and the life cycle such as gender 
and age of the household head. To control for wealth and potential targeting from non-state 
armed actors, we use years of education, and a wealth index constructed using principal 
components of household assets. We include variables for family composition (number of 
members less 14 years of age, between 14-60 years old, and more than 60 years of age). 
Lastly, we have a dummy variable equal to one if the household is a beneficiary of 
Familias en Acción, a conditional cash transfer program. 
We have a vector of land plot characteristic to control for variables that influence 
agricultural productivity. These variables also account for the value of land, thereby 
signaling the likelihood of being a victim of non-state armed actors. The controls include a 
dummy variable equal to one if the land plot has access to water sources, a set of dummy 
variables that show the fertility of their land plot, a dummy variable indicating whether the 
household has a formal legal title over the land plot, the rental value of the land
5
, the size of 
the land plot and altitude above the sea level. We control for the distance in kilometers 
from the land plot to the state capital, primary roads, other roads, nearest seashore, and the 
nearest illicit crop cultivation. In order to capture other economic shocks that might be 
correlated to conflict shocks, we include three variables that account for climate shocks: 
number of months during the previous years in which rain was below the historic mean, 
number of months during the previous years in which rain was above the historic mean, and 
the rainfall historic mean (Miguel, Satyanath et al. 2004). 
                                                          
5
 Based on Colombian tax code and the appraisal values by municipality from IGAC, we calculate the rent for 
each household. The Colombian tax code states that the commercial value of a property must be maximum 
two times its appraisal, and that the rent should be maximum 1% of the commercial value. We calculate the 
rent for each household according to farm size.   
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Since the data is geo-coded, we construct a rich set of geographical controls at the rural 
district level that influence agricultural productivity and the attractiveness of the rural 
district for non-state armed actors. The controls are distance in kilometers to the nearest 
river, and distance to the nearest water routes (sea or river). We complement these variables 
with information collected in the rural district questionnaire and include a dummy variable 
equal to one if the rural district has no access to credits, daily agricultural wage, and a price 
index of agricultural goods produced in the rural district
6
. 
Given that conflict in Colombia has a long history and intensified during the last two 
decades, we include the average municipal homicide rates for the period ranging from 1993 
and 2000. This variable controls for the historic effect of conflict. For the estimations on 
access to financial credits, we control for the number of banks in the municipality to 
account for general equilibrium effects. We use clustered standard errors at the rural district 
level.  
4.3.Descriptive statistics 
Presence of non-state armed actors, years of presence and incidence of covariate shock 
have a large variation across and within regions. Table 1 presents the distribution of years 
of presence for rural districts. More than three quarters of rural districts did not have 
presence of non-state armed actors between 2001 and 2010. The average years of presence 
of non-state armed actors are 0,64, with a higher concentration on one or four years. In 
three rural districts, non-state armed actors have been present six years. These districts are 
located in the Central-Eastern region, a region in which non-state armed actors have exerted 
a strong influence for many years.  
[Table 1 goes about here] 
Presence of non-state armed actors and incidence of covariate shocks do not necessary 
overlap. Table 2 reports incidence of covariate shocks by regions. We divide incidence for 
                                                          
6
 We use the price per kilogram for each product by State for the period ranging from for 2006 and 2010, and 
calculate the average price for each community. Based on ELCA, we calculate the average production in 
kilograms by rural district. This data is used to compute the Paasche Index  
 
. 
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rural districts with and without at least one year of presence of non-state armed actors. 
Incidence of covariate conflict-induced shocks affects from 5 to 52 percent of the rural 
districts. In the Middle-Atlantic, the incidence of shocks is much lower for districts with 
presence than without presence of non-state armed actors, and in the Coffee region the 
percentages are slightly lower. Map 1 depicts overlapping between incidence of conflict 
shocks and presence of non-state armed actors for one of the four regions. The map clearly 
shows that violent shocks and presence of non-state armed actors do not necessarily 
coincide. Conflict-induced shocks occur frequently in rural district in which non-state 
armed actors are not present. Near 27 percent of rural districts with no presence of armed 
groups face a conflict shock, while this figure is 10.1 percent for rural districts with 
presence. 
Two reasons may explain this lower incidence. As discussed by Kalyvas (2006), violence 
against the civil population might be lower in regions with strong control from an 
hegemonic non-state armed actors. Another potential explanation is that the likelihood of 
underreporting incidence of violence is larger in regions with a stronger presence of non-
state armed actors. Although we are able to correct for measurement error in years of 
presence, we do not have alternative sources of information for correcting incidence of 
covariate shocks. However, in the estimation we control for past history of homicide rates 
in the municipality, which is potentially correlated with incidence today.  
When we divide incidence by type of shock, we find some interesting patterns. First, 
frequency of homicides is lower in rural districts with presence of non-state armed actors. 
With the exception of the Cundi-Boyacense region, a region near the capital of Colombia 
and relatively peaceful, all the other regions exhibit this pattern. Second, cattle theft 
exhibits the larger incidence for all types of shocks, in particular in districts with presence 
of non-state armed actors. This may signal a breakdown of the rule of law that creates ideal 
conditions for criminal groups to operate. Cattle theft implies asset depletion and a direct 
impact on agricultural production. Third, threats from armed groups are higher in the 
Middle Atlantic, the region with lower incidence of conflict-induced shocks. In these 
regions, non-state armed actors may exert a strong control, leading to higher threats, but 
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lower incidence of other violent shocks. These patterns provide additional supports to 
Kalyvas (2006) hypothesis.  
[Table 2 goes about here] 
Table 3 presents descriptive statistics for all the outcome variables. We divide the results 
for rural districts without and with at least one year of presence from non-state armed 
actors, and with and without incidence of covariate conflict-induced shocks. In regions with 
a least one year of presence, households dedicate more percentage of land to perennial 
crops and pasture. By requiring less attention from farmers, both productive activities might 
be better suited for regions with armed conflict. In addition, cattle provide daily cash and 
can be easily sold if households are forced to migrate. Access to credit from formal 
financial institutions is higher for households located in regions with at least one year of 
presence. Higher access to formal institutions may result from targeting of non-state armed 
actors to wealthier households, and their decision to establish presence in wealthier rural 
districts with a larger supply of formal credits.  
Agricultural outcomes for households living in rural districts with covariate violent shocks 
are also different. These households dedicate less land to perennial crops, and more land to 
seasonal crops and pasture. In addition, these households had a higher access to formal 
credits, which may result from targeting to wealthier households in the community. 
 [Table 3 goes about here] 
Rural districts with at least one year of presence of non-state armed actors are 
systematically different from those without presence (Tables 4a, 4b and 5). The former 
have a younger population, and with lower educational levels. For other household 
characteristics, the differences are not statistically significant. In rural districts with 
presence of non-state armed actors, land erosion is more prevalent and water sources are 
scarcer. These rural districts seem to be more isolated, yet closer to river and water routes, 
which facilitate the actions of non-state armed actors. Lastly, input prices and prices of 
agricultural goods are higher.  
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Tables 4a, 4b and 5 show differences for households with and without incidence of 
conflict-induced shocks are more systematic than for presence/non-presence of armed 
groups. Rural districts with conflict-induced shocks report a lager informality of property 
rights and an apparently lower soil quality. These districts are isolated and far away from 
the state’s capital, roads, and sea- shores, but these households are closer to regions with 
illicit crop production. Despite this isolation, the number of banks in the municipality is 
larger, and homicide rates during 1993 and 2000 were lower. 
 [Table 4a goes about here] 
[Table 4b goes about here] 
[Table 5 goes about here] 
 
4.4. Estimation results 
This paper examines the impact of conflict on agricultural production of small farmers. We 
explore two channels through which conflict affects agricultural production: presence of 
non-state armed actors, and incidence of violent shocks. We concentrate on yearly 
agricultural revenues and costs, land use, credits and investments. For each outcome, we 
report three columns. The first column uses continuous variables for years of presence from 
non-state armed actors and the number types of conflict shocks. The second column 
includes dummy variables for each year and each type of shock in order to capture non-
linear effects. Since conflict may also induce general equilibrium effects, we control for 
daily agricultural wages, if rural district has problems to access credit and agricultural 
prices at the rural district level in the third column.  
Table 6 reports the estimation results for yearly agricultural revenue per hectare. When we 
include conflict variables as linear, we do not find a statistically significant association 
between years of presence or conflict-induced shocks, on the one hand, and yearly 
agricultural revenues, on the other. Column 2 shows the non-linear effects of conflict 
variables. Incidence of conflict shock is negatively associated with yearly agricultural 
revenues per hectare only for households living in rural districts confronting the largest 
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number of shocks. This effect is accentuated after controlling for potential general 
equilibrium effects, which may signal the association is transmitted through a lower 
productivity, and not lower prices. The yearly revenue per hectare of households living in 
rural districts with three types of conflict shocks is 57.6 percent lower, which is equivalent 
to a reduction of 1.13 pesos/hectare on average yearly revenues.  
Presence of non-state armed actors show a highly non-linear association. In rural districts 
with only one year of presence, the yearly agricultural revenue per hectare is higher, yet for 
districts under six years of presence, revenues are lower. The latter association disappears 
once the estimation controls for potential general equilibrium effects. The positive 
correlation during the first year of presence may result from non-state armed actors 
targeting richer regions. Although we control for several households and regional 
characteristics to account for this potential targeting, we are not able to fully control for 
this. The negative association for six years of presence seems to be driven by general 
equilibrium effects, and not a contraction of agricultural productivity. Rural districts with a 
longer presence of non-state armed actors may have weaker markets, and lower prices for 
final goods, which might explain the lower agricultural revenues per hectare.  
 [Table 6 goes about here] 
In contrast to agricultural revenues, costs per hectare are less sensitive to presence of non-
state armed actors or conflict-induced shocks as results in Table 7 show. In fact, the 
coefficient estimate for conflict-induced shocks is not statistically significant in the three 
different estimations. The first year of presence of non-state armed actors is associated with 
costs 49.4 percent higher. The effect in costs persists after controlling for general 
equilibrium effects. Thus, higher costs are not the result of a sharp increase in daily wages. 
Since yields in the current period are determined by decisions in the previous period, 
households have few alternatives for short-term adjustments. Thus, the effects may easily 
transmit during the first year of presence, while the following years households are able to 
react and may adopt optimal decisions to minimize costs given the presence of non-state 
armed actors.  
[Table 7 goes about here] 
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Direct effects of conflict, through destruction, and indirect impacts due to changes in 
behavior influence differently revenues and costs per hectare. Intense attacks against the 
civil population appear to be related to a lower productivity per hectare. These attacks may 
directly reduce agricultural yield due to destruction and cattle theft. However, costs are 
apparently not affected by these attacks. Given the structure of agricultural production, 
households may have presumably incurred in many of the production costs when attacks 
intensify. On the other hand, presence of non-state armed actors is positively associated 
with costs. Uncertainty, risks and governance structures imposed by armed groups may 
increase costs initially, yet households are able to adjust in subsequent years.  
Land allocation among different agricultural products may explain changes in agricultural 
revenues per year. Table 8 presents the results for percentage of land allocated to perennial 
crops, seasonal crops, and pasture. Land use is strongly associated with conflict-induced 
shocks in regions with a high intensity of conflict. In rural districts with incidence of three 
types of shocks, households dedicate less land to perennial crops, and more to seasonal 
crops: 21.6 percentage points less land is dedicated to perennial crops and 18.1 percentage 
points more land to seasonal crops. Land allocated to pasture for cattle raising shows an 
intuitive result. Households living in districts with incidence of two types of conflict-
induced shocks allocate less land to pasture. Nonetheless, higher incidence of shock is 
correlated to more land allocated to pasture, which presumably is capturing targeting of 
non-state armed actors to wealthier households.  
Presence of non-state armed actors, after controlling for incidence of shocks, is not strongly 
correlated to land allocation. Households living in regions with one or three years of 
presence allocate more land to perennial crops. Three potential explanations may drive this 
result. First, perennial crops require large up-front investments, while profits are recouped 
after several years. Households may prefer to wait to profit from several yields before 
changing land allocation. Since we are covering a short period of time, we might not be 
able to capture changes in land allocation. This applies particularly to the first year of 
presence. Second, perennial crops, by requiring less attention from farmers, provide more 
flexibility to households. Farmers may be absent for several months to avoid being 
victimized without necessarily losing the yield. Third, non-state armed actors may be 
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targeting regions with a larger presence of perennial crops. These regions may be attractive 
to non-state armed actors due to characteristics that also are important for cultivation of 
perennial crops. In fact, the rural districts with three years of presence are all located in the 
coffee region. Coffee is perennial crops and has been traditionally cultivated in this region.  
[Table 8 goes about here] 
Access to credits (formal and informal) and investment decisions are strongly associated 
with conflict through both channels: direct and indirect impacts. Table 9 reports estimation 
results for having formal and informal credits in the year previous to the survey, and having 
done at least one investment since 2007. Households living in regions with a strong 
incidence of conflict-induced shocks show a higher likelihood of having formal credits, and 
lower likelihood of having a credit from family friends. Households in rural districts with 
incidence of three types of shocks are 56.5 percentage points more likely to have a credit 
from a formal institution and 33.9 percentage points less likely to have credits from family 
and friends. A higher access to formal financial markets may signal non-state armed actors 
targeting wealthier households or rural districts. Once we control for number of banks in 
the municipality (column 3), the positive coefficient for access to formal credits persist. 
Thus, this partially rules out the potential targeting of wealthier districts. Households may 
recur to formal credits to mitigate the impacts of conflict-induced shocks. The negative 
coefficient on informal credits shows a potential substitution between formal and informal 
credits. Because all households are presumably affected by the covariate violent shock, 
albeit in a different intensity, support from families and friends may dwindle and 
households need to seek support from formal institutions.  
Presence of non-state armed actors is also associated with access to formal and informal 
credits. During the first years of presence, households are less likely to have access to 
credits from formal financial institutions. The coefficient estimate continues to be 
statistically significant after controlling for general equilibrium effects. The risk and 
uncertainty of living amidst conflict may prevent households from acquiring debts that are 
difficult to honor if the conflict worsens. However, households seem to habituate after 
some years. Credits from formal financial institutions are more likely for households living 
in regions with five years of presence.  
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The story for informal credits is the opposite. During the first year of presence, credits from 
family and friends are 12.4 percentage points more likely and appear to substitute for 
formal credits. As time passes, credits from family and friends are lower such that for 
households living in regions with four or five years of presence the coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant. A decrease in trust among community members and the 
difficult conditions shared by households in the rural district may explain this lower access 
to informal credits.  
Investment decisions are strongly associated with incidence of shocks and presence of non-
state armed actors. Aggressions against the population are associated with much lower 
investment from farmers. Households living in regions with incidence of two or three 
shocks have a probability of investment 12.3 and 21.5 percentage points lower, 
respectively. Therefore, changes in investment decisions not only respond to risk and 
uncertainty, but also to the direct impacts of conflict. 
Years of presence from non-state armed actors have a non-linear effect. As we discussed, 
presence of armed groups increases risk and uncertainty inducing households to adjust 
investment decisions. The third year of presence is associated with a likelihood of 
investment 11.0 percentage points lower. Interestingly, after controlling for general 
equilibrium effects, the effect is less strong, showing some of the reductions in investment 
are due to changes in prices and interest rates. After five years of presence, investment is 
much higher. Farmers residing in these regions have a probability of investment 36.4 
percentage points higher. Farmers may learn to live amidst conflict and may update the 
investments they have postponed for several years. 
[Table 9 goes about here] 
Short-term production decisions appear to be more influenced by conflict. Adjustments in 
land use respond sharply to violent shocks, when conflict intensity is high. Nonetheless, 
presence of non-state armed actors is not strongly associated with differences in land use. 
Because modifications in land use have long-term consequences, households may allocate 
land use differently under extreme violence. If households learn to live amidst conflict, 
households may prefer to adjust variables that can be easily modified, such as credits and 
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investments. Access to credits, formal and informal, and investments respond strongly to 
shocks and presence of armed groups. Households seem to substitute between formal and 
informal credits to cover their production needs. Investments are strongly associated with 
violent shocks and presence of non-state armed actors. However, households apparently 
habituate to their presence and, after years of presence, investment recovers. 
5. Conclusions 
This paper studies how conflict influences households’ agricultural decisions, and examines 
the potential channels of this association. We explore whether households respond 
differently to direct impacts of conflict, such as destruction and devastation, and to indirect 
impacts, such as uncertainty, risk and the governance structures imposed by non-state 
armed actors. Households may react strongly to violent shocks and presence of non-state 
armed actors if conflict is recent. However, households may learn to live amidst conflict, 
and adapt their behavior to prevent aggressions from non-state armed actors, and mitigate 
the economic consequences of violence.  
We apply a household survey representative of four Colombian micro-regions. Colombia 
has faced a civil war for more than half a century; thus, it is the ideal context to investigate 
how households adjust their decisions in conflict-ridden regions. Our empirical strategy 
compares rural districts within states with a wide variation in the intensity and history of 
the conflict. Since finding an instrumental variable strongly correlated with violence and 
not agricultural production is difficult, we include a rich set of controls at the household, 
land plot, rural district, and municipality level. These controls reduce the potential omitted 
variable bias, yet we are not claiming causality of our results.  
The results of the paper show that households’ responses to violent shocks and presence of 
non-state armed actors differ. Violent shocks are associated with lower yearly agricultural 
revenues per hectare, while costs are not affected by shocks. High intensity of shocks 
induce changes in land use such that households in rural districts with a larger number of 
violent shocks use less land on perennial crops, and more on seasonal crops and pasture. In 
addition, investments in these districts are much lower. Households appear to resort to 
formal credits to mitigate the violent shocks. However, higher likelihood of formal credits 
may also result from targeting of wealthier households. On the other hand, the likelihood of 
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having an informal credit is lower for these households. As all households are facing 
difficult conditions, reliance on informal support is less likely.  
Presence of non-state armed actors is associated with different responses from households. 
We find that, similarly to Kalyvas (2006), presence of armed groups does not necessarily 
coincide with violent aggressions against the civil population. In fact, incidence of violent 
shocks is lower in rural districts with presence of non-state armed actors. This implies 
households may adjust behavior to prevent future aggressions, become less visible to armed 
groups, or to reduce other indirect costs of conflict. Results show that the association 
between yearly agricultural revenues per hectare and presence of non-state armed actors is 
highly non-linear, with a positive association in the first year of presence and a negative 
one for six years of presence. Costs are higher during the first year of presence and 
thereafter households seem to adjust and re-optimize decisions to mitigate this increase. 
Presence of non-state armed actors induces households to adopt short-term responses, such 
as contraction of investments and credits. Similarly to costs, contractions in investments 
occur during the first years, yet investments rebound after longer years of presence. 
Decisions with medium or long-term consequences, such as land use, are less responsive to 
presence of non-state armed actors. It is important to note that Colombia has not faced a 
complete breakdown of markets as a consequence of conflict, reducing the need of 
households to retrieve from markets and recur to food crops. 
This paper finds households’ agricultural decisions are associated with violent shocks and 
presence of non-state armed actors. Households living in regions with a high conflict 
intensity seem to borne the larger costs of conflict through lower yearly agricultural 
revenues, and changes in productions decisions. In regions with presence of non-state 
armed actors, households appear to learn to live amidst conflict, yet in a lower-income 
equilibrium. Traditional post-conflict policies concentrate on reconstruction efforts, which 
are necessary to increase production in a short period of time as this paper shows. However, 
policies should also aim to restitute assets, foster credits, and create favorable conditions to 
reduce uncertainty. Improving the rule of law and reducing uncertainty induce households 
to expand investment and avoid sub-optimal decisions.  
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Graph 1. Number of municipalities with presence of armed groups 
 
 
Source: Authors’ calculation based on CEDE Municipal Panel 
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Map 1. Presence of non-state armed actors and incidence of conflict-induced shocks 
 
Source: Authors’ calculations based on ELCA (Wave I) and National Government 
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Table 1. Years of presence of non-state armed actors (% rural districts) 
 
 
 
  
Years of presence Rural districts Percentage
0 171 76.3%
1 23 10.3%
2 3 1.3%
3 2 0.9%
4 19 8.5%
5 3 1.3%
6 3 1.3%
Mean (Standard deviation) 0,64 (1,4)
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I) and 
National Government
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Table 2. Incidence of conflict-induced shocks by regions: with and without presence of 
non-state armed actors (% rural districts) 
 
 
No presence Presence
Middle-Atlantic 21% 5%
   Cattle Theft 6% 0%
   Homicides 6% 0%
   Land seizure 0% 0%
   Kidnaps 0% 0%
   Threats from armed groups 8% 14%
Cundi-Boyacense 34% 52%
   Cattle Theft 59% 69%
   Homicides 13% 19%
   Land seizure 0% 0%
   Kidnaps 0% 0%
   Threats from armed groups 0% 0%
Coffee region 29% 14%
   Cattle Theft 17% 17%
   Homicides 13% 8%
   Land seizure 4% 0%
   Kidnaps 0% 0%
   Threats from armed groups 4% 0%
Central East 16% 29%
   Cattle Theft 5% 33%
   Homicides 15% 0%
   Land seizure 0% 0%
   Kidnaps 7% 0%
   Threats from armed groups 5% 0%
Rural district
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I) and 
National Government
Micro-Region
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Table 3. Descriptive statistics: outcome variables 
 
 
 
No Yes No Yes
Annual agricultural income/hectares 2.44 0.08 3.17 0.11
(87.2) (0.50) (100.0) (0.47)
Costs/hectares 1.58 0.09 2.05 0.09
(56.99) (0.82) (65.42) (0.70)
% of land used in perennial crops 23.4% 27.4% 27.4% 19.2%
(0.34) (0.37) (0.36) (0.31)
% of land used in seasonal crops 16.7% 15.3% 15.3% 18.2%
(0.29) (0.27) (0.29) (0.29)
% of land used in pasture 6.6% 10.0% 6.1% 9.2%
(0.18) (0.21) (0.17) (0.20)
=1 if invested in land plot since 2007 19.1% 23.2% 19.3% 20.8%
(0.39) (0.42) (0.40) (0.41)
Observations 1,439 362 1,092 709
=1 if hh had a credit with banks on survey day 62.6% 68.7% 58.9% 70.8%
(0.48) (0.46) (0.49) (0.45)
=1 if hh had credit with family and friends on survey day 29.2% 30.0% 29.7% 29.0%
(0.45) (0.46) (0.46) (0.45)
Observations 933 300 698 535
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I) and National Government * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
- -
 =1 at least one year of presence  =1 at least one conflict-induced shock
- -
** ***
- ***
- -
*** ***
** -
** ***
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Table 4a. Descriptive statistics: control variables (household characteristics) 
 
 
 
 
No Yes No Yes
Number of members 4.71 4.62 - 4.64 4.75 -
(2.02) (1.94) (1.99) (2.00)
 =1 if household head is man 85.4% 85.3% - 84.7% 86.4% -
(0.35) (0.35) (0.36) (0.34)
Household head's age 46.6 45.1 ** 46.2 46.3 -
(12.6) (11.8) (12.5) (12.4)
Household's head years of education 4.88 4.51 ** 4.87 4.68 -
(3.58) (3.38) (3.47) (3.62)
Members between 14-60 years old 2.93 2.87 - 2.94 2.89 -
(1.41) (1.37) (1.40) (1.40)
Members less than 14 years 1.36 1.35 - 1.29 1.43 **
(1.34) (1.30) (1.31) (1.36)
Members more than 60 years 0.42 0.40 - 0.41 0.42 -
(0.68) (0.66) (0.67) (0.70)
 =1 if is beneficiary of Familias en Acción 37.2% 40.0% - 38.0% 37.8% -
(0.48) (0.49) (0.49) (0.49)
Wealth index 0.05 -0.10 - 0.09 -0.09 *
(2.27) (2.03) (2.36) (1.99)
Observations 933 300 698 535
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I), National Government, IDEAM, IGAC and CEDE Municipal Panel.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
 =1 at least one year of presence  =1 at least one conflict-induced shock
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Table 4b. Descriptive statistics: control variables (land plot and geographic characteristics) 
 
No Yes No Yes
Land plot size (hectares) 1.56 2.82 - 3.5 3.2 -
(4.78) (4.88) (5.03) (4.48)
 =1 if land tenure is formal 25.9% 26.0% - 28.7% 22.4% ***
(0.44) (0.44) (0.45) (0.42)
Rental value of land 564,870 536,983 - 526,645 599,104 -
(1'179,092) (741,126) (1'113,876) (1'054,468)
 =1 if has access to water sources 65.1% 54.7% *** 61.2% 64.3% -
(0.48) (0.50) (0.49) (0.48)
 =1 if fertility is high 1.5% 1.7% - 1.6% 1.5% -
(0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12)
 =1 if fertility is from high to moderate 2.1% 0.0% *** 1.7% 1.5% -
(0.14) (0.00) (0.13) (0.12)
 =1 if fertility is moderate 9.1% 6.3% ** 11.0% 5.0% ***
(0.29) (0.24) (0.31) (0.22)
 =1 if fertility is from moderate to high 20.6% 7.7% *** 24.6% 8.0% ***
(0.40) (0.27) (0.43) (0.27)
 =1 if fertility is from moderate to low 0.9% 1.3% - 0.9% 1.1% -
(0.09) (0.11) (0.09) (0.11)
 =1 if fertility is low 10.6% 18.7% *** 6.3% 20.7% ***
(0.31) (0.39) (0.24) (0.41)
 =1 if fertility is from low to moderate 22.0% 39.0% *** 23.4% 29.7% ***
(0.41) (0.49) (0.42) (0.46)
 =1 if fertility is very low 7.8% 6.7% - 7.4% 7.7% -
(0.27) (0.25) (0.26) (0.27)
 =1 if fertility is from very low to low 24.7% 18.0% *** 21.9% 24.5% -
(0.43) (0.38) (0.41) (0.43)
Months of drought 1.6 1.5 ** 1.3 1.9 ***
(1.11) (0.96) (1.10) (0.93)
Months of wetness 0.69 0.80 ** 0.97 0.39 ***
(0.88) (0.93) (0.95) (0.69)
Average historic rainfall 147.8 130.5 *** 148.3 137.4 ***
(28.6) (36.3) (29.1) (33.4)
Height above sea level 1,466 1,705 *** 1,197 1,951 ***
(1,020) (1,050) (958) (970)
Distance to the state's capital (km) 66.2 73.9 *** 61.6 76.6 ***
(44.7) (42.3) (36.5) (51.4)
Distance to primary roads (km) 7.4 7.8 - 7.8 7.0 **
(9.15) (7.28) (9.00) (8.37)
Distance to other roads (km) 3.8 3.2 *** 3.5 3.9 **
(2.37) (2.29) (2.4) (2.3)
Distance to the sea (km) 188.5 214.2 *** 162.3 237.1 ***
(125.2) (104.3) (113.1) (117.8)
Distance to coca crops (km) 81.0 81.6 - 88.3 71.8 ***
(33.6) (36.6) (33.7) (32.8)
Observations 933 300 698 535
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I), National Government, IDEAM, IGAC and CEDE Municipal Panel.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
 =1 at least one year of 
presence
 =1 at least one conflict-
induced shock
35 
 
Table 5. Descriptive statistics: control variables (rural district and municipality characteristics) 
 
 
 
 
No Yes No Yes
Distance to nearest river (km) 13.1 11.2 *** 14.5 10.1 ***
(11.8) (10.5) (12.4) (9.7)
Distance to sea and river routes (km) 84.1 79.2 *** 75.6 92.5 ***
(20.0) (35.9) (23.4) (23.5)
Price index of the community 1.14 1.22 *** 1.17 1.15 -
(0.33) (0.33) (0.27) (0.40)
 =1 if community has problems to get credit 41.8% 44.0% - 41.8% 43.0% -
(0.49) (0.50) (0.49) (0.50)
Number of banks on municipality 1.8 1.5 *** 1.96 1.44 ***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.88) (0.95)
Daily agricultural wage 11,788 12,760 *** 11,725 12,414 ***
(2,974) (1,871) (3,157) (2,126)
Municipal homicide rate 1993-2000 61.1 62.3 - 65.8 55.7 ***
(45.4) (44.4) (51.6) (34.2)
Observations 933 300 698 535
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I), National Government, IDEAM, IGAC and CEDE Municipal Panel.
* p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
 =1 at least one year of presence  =1 at least one conflict-induced shock
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Table 6. OLS estimation – yearly agricultural revenues per hectare 
 
  
Shock intensity 0.0727
[0.0803]
Years of armed group presence 0.00810
[0.0544]
Intensity 1 0.132 0.145
[0.128] [0.129]
Intensity 2 0.179 0.152
[0.219] [0.226]
Intensity 3 -0.498* -0.579*
[0.295] [0.307]
One year of presence 0.248* 0.269*
[0.135] [0.138]
Two years of presence 0.260 0.218
[0.191] [0.192]
Three years of presence 0.263 0.304
[0.689] [0.673]
Four years of presence -0.205 -0.242
[0.364] [0.357]
Five years of presence 0.298 0.365
[0.365] [0.354]
Six years of presence -0.882* -0.783
[0.513] [0.519]
Observations 1801 1801 1801
R-squared 0.161 0.165 0.166
Household and land plot characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Rural district and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes
General equilibrium variables No No Yes
Fixed effects by department Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by rural district Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I), National Government, IDEAM, 
IGAC and CEDE Municipal Panel.
(1) (2) (3)
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Table 7. OLS estimation – yearly agricultural costs per hectare 
 
 
 
 
Shock intensity 0.112
[0.0878]
Years of armed group presence 0.0909
[0.0706]
Intensity 1 0.166 0.190
[0.135] [0.134]
Intensity 2 0.117 0.0472
[0.254] [0.256]
Intensity 3 0.373 0.225
[0.280] [0.317]
One year of presence 0.452*** 0.494***
[0.157] [0.164]
Two years of presence 0.330 0.215
[0.357] [0.356]
Three years of presence 0.646 0.773
[1.036] [0.961]
Four years of presence -0.0804 -0.163
[0.380] [0.383]
Five years of presence 0.433 0.625
[0.518] [0.484]
Six years of presence -0.0600 0.188
[0.459] [0.473]
Observations 1801 1801 1801
R-squared 0.208 0.212 0.218
Household and land plot characteristics Yes Yes Yes
Rural district and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes
General equilibrium variables No No Yes
Fixed effects by department Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by rural district Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
(1) (2) (3)
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I), National Government, IDEAM, 
IGAC and CEDE Municipal Panel.
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Table 8. OLS estimation – land allocation: perennial crops, seasonal crops, and pasture (Percentage of total land plot) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Shock intensity -0.0124 0.0195* 0.00518
[0.0159] [0.0118] [0.0120]
Years of armed group presence 0.00465 0.00106 0.00298
[0.00943] [0.00781] [0.00541]
Intensity 1 -0.0340 -0.0303 0.0163 0.0160 0.0178 0.0180
[0.0210] [0.0206] [0.0185] [0.0182] [0.0123] [0.0117]
Intensity 2 0.0390 0.0337 0.0232 0.0268 -0.0401*** -0.0428***
[0.0354] [0.0370] [0.0250] [0.0263] [0.0150] [0.0146]
Intensity 3 -0.192*** -0.216*** 0.182*** 0.181*** 0.210*** 0.214***
[0.0471] [0.0425] [0.0366] [0.0365] [0.0222] [0.0213]
One year of presence 0.0829** 0.0880*** -0.0112 -0.0105 0.00448 0.00167
[0.0323] [0.0330] [0.0228] [0.0234] [0.0143] [0.0144]
Two years of presence -0.00527 -0.0119 0.0798 0.0838 -0.0227 -0.0216
[0.0369] [0.0392] [0.0798] [0.0799] [0.0138] [0.0131]
Three years of presence 0.100** 0.105** 0.00698 -0.00245 -0.0161 -0.00864
[0.0503] [0.0528] [0.0283] [0.0305] [0.0113] [0.0124]
Four years of presence -0.0199 -0.0277 0.0568 0.0569 0.0697 0.0740
[0.0632] [0.0646] [0.0598] [0.0627] [0.0479] [0.0452]
Five years of presence -0.00344 0.00541 -0.0335 -0.0424 -0.0149 -0.0136
[0.0839] [0.0905] [0.0478] [0.0485] [0.0387] [0.0398]
Six years of presence -0.120 -0.101 -0.0832 -0.0927 0.0230 0.0256
[0.0842] [0.0817] [0.0600] [0.0638] [0.0562] [0.0562]
Observations 1801 1801 1801 1801 1801 1801 1801 1801 1801
R-squared 0.199 0.208 0.211 0.220 0.224 0.226 0.135 0.149 0.154
Household and land plot characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural district and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
General equilibrium variables No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Fixed effects by department Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by rural district Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I), National Government, IDEAM, IGAC and CEDE Municipal Panel.
Perennial Crops Seasonal Crops Pastures
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Table 9. Probit estimation – access to formal and informal credits, and investment decisions during 2009 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Shock intensity 0.0462 -0.0229 -0.0428**
[0.0285] [0.0247] [0.0172]
Years of armed group presence 0.00321 -0.0142 0.0163
[0.0159] [0.0151] [0.0195]
Intensity 1 -0.0296 -0.0519 0.0300 0.0273 -0.0238 -0.0227
[0.0368] [0.0365] [0.0340] [0.0345] [0.0263] [0.0268]
Intensity 2 0.0819 0.0698 -0.0344 -0.0323 -0.116** -0.123***
[0.0502] [0.0503] [0.0412] [0.0405] [0.0448] [0.0461]
Intensity 3 0.530*** 0.565*** -0.367*** -0.339*** -0.209*** -0.215***
[0.0822] [0.0812] [0.0909] [0.0916] [0.0456] [0.0427]
One year of presence -0.0976* -0.107** 0.120** 0.124** 0.0112 0.0141
[0.0500] [0.0477] [0.0524] [0.0508] [0.0330] [0.0329]
Two years of presence 0.106 0.147 -0.0352 -0.0544 0.0603 0.0467
[0.0806] [0.0940] [0.0973] [0.0978] [0.0504] [0.0541]
Three years of presence -0.0777 -0.0573 0.106 0.115 -0.110*** -0.0932***
[0.111] [0.117] [0.165] [0.144] [0.0343] [0.0322]
Four years of presence 0.0212 0.116 -0.227*** -0.253*** 0.0972 0.0898
[0.102] [0.108] [0.0856] [0.0935] [0.0864] [0.0854]
Five years of presence 0.140 0.222** -0.227*** -0.229*** 0.340*** 0.364***
[0.0871] [0.0864] [0.0750] [0.0873] [0.0921] [0.0972]
Six years of presence -0.0921 0.0249 0.0281 0.0306 -0.127 -0.101
[0.155] [0.155] [0.155] [0.160] [0.143] [0.147]
Observations 1233 1233 1233 1233 1233 1233 1801 1801 1801
R-squared 0.210 0.222 0.231 0.086 0.101 0.105 0.130 0.138 0.141
Household and land plot characteristics Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Rural district and municipality controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
General equilibrium variables No No Yes No No Yes No No Yes
Fixed effects by department Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Clustered by rural district Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Robust standard errors in brackets. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, ***p<0.01
Source: Authors' calculations based on ELCA (Wave I), National Government, IDEAM, IGAC and CEDE Municipal Panel.
 =1 if credit with banks  =1 if credit with family and friends  =1 if at least one investment
